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NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is brought by the crossclaimant-appellant,
Reid Swapp, also known as Reid Swapp Construction Company,
(hereinafter referred to as "SWAPP") from an Order of the Third
Judicial District Court denying his Motion to Set Aside a
Default Judgment entered against him on July 1, 1981, by
Tanglewood SLC Associates, (hereinafter referred to as "TANGLEWOOD"), crossclaimant-respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, The Honorable Hal Taylor, District Judge, presiding,
denied Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment entered
against him by Tanglewood on July 1, 1981.

The Motion was

predicated upon Affidavits on file with the Court and pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(l) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Motion was denied because:
(1)

According to the Court, it was grounded upon a

claim of "negligence" of Swapp's former attorney, which "negligence" the Court reasoned, was imputable to Swapp, and
(2)

Be~ause

Swapp failed to bring his Motion within

the three months of the entry of Judgment as provided by Rule
60(b).

(See transcript of hearing, page 7, lines 18-21.)

-1-
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RELIEF BEING SOUGHT
Crossclaimant-appellant Swapp appeals to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah for a reversal of the lower Court's
Order denying Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment
on grounds that the lower Court erred as follows:
(1)

It erroneously characterized the flagrant

mis~

conduct of Swapp's previous attorney as "negligence";
(2)

It erroneously imputed that impropriety to Swapp;

(3)

It erroneously applied to the circumstances of

this case Rule 60(b)(l) complete with its three month

limita~

tion;

(4)

It failed to properly characterize Swapp's

former attorney's conduct as withdrawal without notice or
abandonment, which amounts to impropriety that cannot be
imputed to Swapp and which is remediable under Rule 60(b)(7),
for which the three month deadline is not applicable;
(5)

In failing to exercise its legal discretion

according to well-established precedent, the Court abused its
discretion;
(6)

That since the Order of the Court denying the

setting aside of the Default was not made within the sound
legal discretion of the Court, but by an abuse thereof, the
Order denying Swapp's Motion should be reversed, the Default
Judgment set aside, and the Execution predicated thereon
declared a nullity.

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FACTS OF THE CASE
On or about June 9, 1980, plaintiff Gardiner &
Gardiner Builders, et al., filed a Complaint against, inter alia
Reid Swapp a/k/a Reid Swapp Construction Company, and Tanglewood SLC, Ltd.
Shortly thereafter Swapp retained Steven D. Luster,
a member of the Utah State Bar, whose offices are located in
Salt Lake City, to represent Swapp in this lawsuit.
On or about July 21, 1980, Swapp, by and through his
attorney of record, Steven D. Luster, filed both his Answer
to plaintiff's Complaint and his Crossclaim against Tanglewood.
On or about December 16, 1980, Tanglewood filed its
Answer to Swapp's Crossclaim.
On or about January 21, 1981, Tanglewood filed a
Crossclaim against Swapp.
At this point the original plaintiff was substituted
by a plaintiff in intervention, David L. Richie d/b/a Richie
Construction Company, (hereinafter referred to as "RICHIE").
On February 19, 1981, Swapp filed his Answer to
Tanglewood's Crossclaim.
At this point what the lower Court characterized as
the "negligence" of Swapp's attorney commenced.
On or about April 2, 1981, Richie served Swapp's
attorney with Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents.

Swapp's attorney never notified Swapp that these

documents had been served or that Swapp was legally obligated
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
to
respond
to
them.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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On or about May 8, 1981, Tanglewood served upon Swapp's
attorney -a set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents; and again Swapp's attorney failed to inform Swapp that
these documents had been served or of Swapp•s obligation to
respond thereto.
On or about June 10, 1981, Swappis attorney, without
Swapp's knowledge or

consen~

stipulated with Tanglewood to respond

to Tanglewood's May 8, 1981, discovery papers by June 17, 1981.
But Swapp's attorney did not inform Swapp of this committment, nor
did he meet this deadline.
On or about June 10, 1981, Tanglewood served upon Swapp'
attorney a Notice of Deposition requiring Swapp'' s attendance at
the offices of Tanglewood'· s attorneys on June 30, 1981, at 9: 30
a.m.

Swapp's attorney failed to inform Swapp of the fact and

details of this deposition; consequently, Swapp did not attend.
On or about June 19

1

1981, Tangle",rn.od made a Motion

To Compel Swapp to respond to their discovery request.

Once

again_, Swapp' s attorney told Swapp nothing about these papers
or their legal significance.
On June 30, 1981, Tanglewood moved the lower Court to
strike Swapp's pleadings.

Swapp's attorney did not inform Swapp

of this Motion, nor did he respond to it.
On July 1, 1981, Tanglewood entered its Default against
Swapp.

Swapp's attorney did not inform him of this fact either.
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Swapp first became aware of his dilemma on or about
October 1, 1981, only after receiving Execution papers on his
wife's real property.

As soon as possible, Swapp enlisted the

aid of his present attorneys, who moved to set aside the Default
Judgment.

That Motion was denied and Swapp makes this appeal.
I

The aforementioned facts are a matter of record with
the Court and part of the Transcript on Appeal.

The pertinent

facts were also set forth in the Affidavit of Reid Swapp
accompanying his Motion To Set Aside the Default Judgment,
the denial of which forms the basis of this Appeal.

It is

to be noted that the facts set forth in that Affidavit were
virtually uncontroverted by any answering

Affidavits~

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE.
In the case of Blyth & Fargo Co.

v. Swenson, 15 U.

345, 59 P. 1027 at 1028 (1897), the Utah Supreme Court held
that:

"An Order denying a Motion to set aside a judgment .

must be regarded as a final judgment and appealable."

Under

this Rule, the Order of the Third Judicial District Court
denying Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is
an appealable Order under Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that "An appeal may be taken to the
Supreme Court from all final orders and judgments . .

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WILL BE REVERSED IF THE ORDER IS NOT HADE
IN THE SOUND LEGAL DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
In the case of Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v.
Trumbo, 17 U. 198, 53 P. 1033 at 1036 (1898), the Utah Supreme
Court held that:

" . . . the setting aside of a judgment by

default rests within the sound legal discretion of the Court,
and the appellate Court will not interfere; but, where, as in
this case, it is made clearly to appear that there was such an
abuse of discretion, through inadvertence or otherwise, as to
render the action erroneous and unlawful, the appellate Court
will control such discretion, and set aside the illegal action.
Such discretion does not confer upon the Court an arbitrary
power beyond that of review.

It is an impartial legal signi-

ficance, which cannot be employed to the injury of any subject,
but must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in accordance
with established principals of law."
Swapp here argues that the Order denying his Motion
to set aside the Default Judgment was not made in the sound
legal discretion of the Third Judicial District Court because,
as shall hereafter be argued more fully, the weight of legal
authority requires the setting aside of such a Judgment when
it is shown that the Judgment was entered against the defendant
because of his attorney's abandoning or withdrawing from his
case without notice.

Because the Court acted without sound

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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legal discretion, the trial court's Order is subject to review
and reversal by the Supreme Court.
POINT III
SOUND LEGAL DISCRETION REQUIRES THE COURT TO
RULE FAIRLY AND JUSTLY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
While there is a need to achieve finality in litigation, judicial discretion must not achieve that end in disregard
of what is right and equitable under the circumstances in a
particular case.

"Each case must . . . depend upon its own

peculiar facts and circumstances."

Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d

855 at 858 (1979).
"The Trial Court must balance two valid considerations;
on the one hand, to relieve the party of the Judgment vitiates
the effect of res judicata and creates a hardship for the
successful litigant by causing him to prosecute more than
once his action and subjecting him to the possible loss of
collecting his Judgment.

On the other hand, the Court desires

to protect the losing part who has not had the opportunity
to present his claim or defense."

Airkem Intermountain, Inc.

v. Parker, 30 U.2d 65, at 67-68, 513 P.2d 429 at 431 (1973).
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant
Swapp has been burdened with a Default Judgment against him
personally in excess of $80,000.00 simply because he was not
aware that his attorney had abandoned him.

No weight was given

by the trial court to the fact that Tanglewood would not be

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unduly prejudiced if the Judgment were set aside, or to the
fact that Swapp had filed his Answer & Crossclaim against
Tanglewood and was attempting to litigate his rights, or to
the fact that immediately upon his realizing his dilemma,
-Swapp retained new counsel to assist him to reassert his rights.
The Court denied Swapp's Motion without regard to the circumstances, thereby further blackening Swapp's already dismal
opinion of the workings of the justice system.
The Supreme Court in Trumbo, supra, fairly pointed
out that "a judge must have due regard to what is just and
fair under existing circumstances and that he not act in an
arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner," Id at 1036.
The Court further stated that "the power of the (trial] court
to set aside judgments .

should be liqerally exercised,

for the purpose of directing proceedings and trying causes
upon their substantial merit; and where the circumstances
which ,lead to the default are such as to cause the Court to
hesitate, it is better to resolve a doubt in favor of the
application so that a trial may be secured on the merits" Id.
POINT IV
THE COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION IF IT FAILS
TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES
SIMILAR TO THOSE PRESENTED BY THE INSTANT CASE.
The trial court should set aside a default judgment
whenever the defaulted party can show:
-8-
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(1)

A reasonable excuse for his non-appearance;

(2)

That he used due diligence in attempting to

(3)

That he was prevented from appearing by circum-

defend;

stances over which he had no control;
(4)

That the non-defaulting party will not be unduly

prejudiced by the setting aside of the judgment; and
(5)

That the defaulting party has a meritorious

defense.
In Heath v. Mower, supra, this Court held that a
defendant who failed to provide a "reasonable excuse for his
non-appearance" should not be relieved from his judgment.

The

implication being that the presentation of a reasonable excuse
would entitle him to relief.

Furthermore, In Airkem Inter-

mountain, Inc., v. Parker, supra, this Court required that a
party, to obtain relief from a Judgment, "must show that he has
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no control."
In cases decided in neighboring jurisdictions, the
further showing that the non-defaulting party would not be
unduly prejudiced and that the defaulting party have a meritorious defense have both been required.

See Buckert v. Briggs,

15 Cal. App. 3d 296, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971), and St. Vrain
Development Co., v. F. & S. Development Co., 470 P.2d 49
(Colo., 1970).
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the present case Swapp had a reasonable excuse for
his non-appearance to Tanglewood's discovery request; and had
used due diligence in retaining an attorney, but was prejudiced
by his attorney'·s failure--complete failure--to communicate
with him.

Swapp's non-responsiveness was due to circumstances

over which he had no control, for he continued to contact his
attorney, but received no word from counsel with regard to the
progress of his case or his obligations to answer pleadings
filed therein.

Swapp did his best to defend, but was hindered

by the inexcusable inpropriety and misconduct of his attorney.
That he had a meritorious defense is clear from the record,
and that Tanglewood would not have been prejudiced by the
setting aside of the default judgment is also clear.
Under these circumstances, the Default should have
been set aside.

According to this Court's holding in Board

of Education of the Granite School District v. Cox, 14 U.2d
385, 384 P.2d 806 at 807 (1963), "it is an abuse of discretion
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable
justification for· the defendant's failure to appear and answer."
In another case, this Court observed that "to clamp
a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a
hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing . . . For
that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there
-10-
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is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear and timely application is ma d e to set asi"de. "
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U.2d 52, 356 P.2d 951 at
952 (1962).
In a case where an attorney abandons his client or
withdraws without notice and the client is consequently
burdened with a judgment against him, this Court has held that
it is an abuse of discretion not to set aside the judgment.
The controlling case is Interstate Excavating v. Agla
Development, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).

In that case a defendant

did not receive notice of the trial date from his attorney
after the attorney's withdrawal from the case.

Upon receipt

of notice of the default judgment, the defendant, like Swapp,
contacted new counsel who diligently sought to attack the
default judgment.

The Court stated that "where there is doubt

about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of doing so."
Similar Utah Supreme Court holdings have been handed
down in cases where default judgments have been entered due
to the impropriety or misconduct of the defaulting party's
attorney:

See Blyth v. Fargo Co., v. Swenson, supra; Utah

Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, supra; Airkem Intermountain:
Inc., v. Parker, supra.
In agreement with these Utah's decisions are the
holdings of the highest appellate courts of a number of
neighboring jurisdictions:
-11-
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In the Arizona case of Treadway v. Meador, 103 Ariz.
83, 436 P.2d 902 (1968), the Arizona Supreme Court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside
a judgment of dismissal entered for failure of parties to
answer Interrogatories.

Like Swapp, these parties had

engaged an attorney and attempted to comply with the Court's
directions, but theiretained attorney failed to file answers
as requested.

See also Hansen v. Willis, 8 Ariz. App. 175,

444 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1968).
In the California case of Buckert v. Briggs, supra,
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held
that where plaintiffs' attorney had no basis for his belief
that plaintiffs had lost interest in their case and plaintiffs
had assumed and had no reason not to

bel~evethat

their attorney

would represent them, their attorney's failure to advise the
plaintiffs of their trial, apparently pursuant to a preconceived intention not to act in their behalf, constituted positive
misconduct within the exception to the general rule that
accident or mistake authorizing relief from a default judgment
may not be predicated upon neglect of a party's attorney,
whose negligence is imputed to his client.
judgment was properly set aside.

Therefore, the

These plaintiffs, like

corssclaimant-appellant Swapp, had reposed their trust in an
attorney who had through positive misconduct abandoned his
clients.

The California Court did not deem such misconduct
-12-
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as "neglect" which could be imputed to these plaintiffs.
By the same token the misconduct of Swapp's attorney should
not be imputed to Swapp.

Abandonment without notice is

according to the California Court of Appeals, positive misconduct that falls within the "exception to the general rule
that the negligence of an attorney may be imputed to his client.
In the Colorado case of Coerber v. Rath, 435

P~2d

228

(Colo., 1968), the Court held that where the primary cause of
the defendant's failure to answer Interrogatories was the
inexcusable neglect of their counsel in whom they had placed
their confidence and wbiere the setting aside of the default
judgment would not have unwarrantedly prejudiced the plaintiff,
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside
the default.
In another Colorado case, St. Vrain

Dev~lopment

Co.,

v. F. & S. Development Co., supra, the Court held that where
a party has not been guilty of negligence, a judgment against
him may be set aside if it was obtained because of the
negligence of his attorney, provided he has a good cause on
the merits, substantial justice will be done and can be done
without undue prejudice to the other party.
In the Oklahoma case of Rogers v. Sheppard, 192 P.2d
643 (Okl. 1948), the Court there held that the abandonment of
a client's cause by his attorney, without the knowledge of
the client, constituted "unavoidable casualty or misfortune,"
under a statute authorizing the Court to vacate a default
-13-
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judgment and that a denial of the client's motion to set aside
was a clear abuse of discretion.

See also, Grayson v. Smith,

165 P.2d 984 (Okl .. 1946); and Hart v. Pharaoh, 359 P.2d 1074
(Okl. 1961).
In the Hawaii case of Stafford v. Dickson, 374 P.2d
665 (Ha., 1962), the Court held that where a defense attorney
was permitted to withdraw on the day of the Pre-Trial Hearing
and where the Court knew that the defendant had left the State
and was not notified of the hearing or of the withdrawal of
his attorney and a default judgment was entered against the
defendant for his failure to appear for the Pre-Trial, the
defendant was deprived of due process of law and the default
judgment was declared void.
Pursu~sive

authority from other jurisdictions supports

the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Interstate
Development, supra:

~xcavating

v. Agla

where a party is defaulted and judgment

is entered against him due to the misconduct of his attorney,
the client is not to be faulted under the theory that the
negligence of his attorney is imputable to the client; and
that upon a showing that the client was without knowledge
of his attorney's abandon and withdrawal a default judgment
entered in such circumstances should be set aside in the
interest of judgment.
. -14-
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POINT V
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT
WITHIN THE THREE MONTH TIME LIMIT.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that:
Upon motion and upon such terms as are just, the
Court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; . . . or (7) Any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.
The Motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and for reasons (1), (2),(3), or (4), not more than
three months after the Judgment, Order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Swapp made his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on October 9, 1981, just three months and nine days
after the Judgment was entered against him on July 1, 1981.
Swapp missed the deadline for his Motion by nine days, and
this happened because he did not learn of the Judgment against
him until on or about September 20, 1981, as a result of
Tanglewood's Execution against his wife's property.

Swapp

was not able to retain new counsel until on or about October 1,
1981, and his new counsel were not able to obtain the copies
of the pleadings in the case until sometime thereafter.

The

Motion to set aside was filed on October 9, 1981, along with
new counsel's Notice of Appearance.
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Because Swapp missed the three month deadline by
nine days, Swapp (who had attempted diligently to defend himself in this lawsuit) had entered against him a Default Judgment of over $80,000.00 and an Execution Sale has taken place
in which Tanglewood has purchased both his home and his wife's
property, valued at approximately $150,000.00, for the sum of
$45,000.00.
The trial court allowed this Default Judgment to
stand in spite of these circumstances, on grounds that defendant's Motion was barred by the three month time limit.
Defendant Swapp argues that his Motion should have
been granted under Rule 60(b)(7), on grounds that a Motion made
under sub-paragraph (7) is not subject to the three month
Fule, but may be made within a "reasonable time."

Though

defendant raised both the Rule 60(b)(l) ground of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" as well as the
Rule 60(b)(7) ground, it is clear from the record and the
affidavits, that Swapp's former attorney was neither mistaken,
inadvertent, surprised, or excusably negligent in his handling
of Swapp's case.

Steven D. Luster was involved in gross

negligence, inexcusable neglect, impropriety, and misconduct
that caused Swapp, in the words of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, "unavoidable casualty and misfortune" which was beyond
the control of Swapp and which cannot justly be attributed
to him as layman who reposed his confidence and trust in an
attorney whom he assumed was representing him, but who had
abandoned him without notice.
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Clearly these facts require the application of
Rule 60 (b) (7), for they are reasons "justifying the relief
from the operation of the Judgment" which are not governed
by the three month Rule.

Swapp had no way of knowing; except

from his attorney, about the developments taking place in his
case.
his

As soon as Swapp ·discovered the problem, he acted and

pre~ent

attorneys acted with dispatch.

If there is a

circumstance in which relief from a Judgment is warranted and
where a Motion for Setting Aside a Judgment should be exempted
from the three month deadline under sub-paragraph (7) of
Rule 60(b), then surely this is it.

Just such a case as

this must have been contemplated by those drafting the Rule's
"reasonable time" language.
CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances of this case, where Swapp was
virtually abandoned by his at'torney without notice and suffered
therefor the entry of the Default Judgment against him on July 1
1981, in a sum exceeding $80,000.00, a Motion to Set Aside the
·nefault Judgment, brought three months and nine days later,
should not have been denied by the Third Judicial District
Court because that Motion was brought too late or because it
was grounded upon "negligence" that is imputable to the client,
but should have been granted on grounds that the Motion was
predicated on circumstances evidencing, not "mistake, inadver-17-
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tence

surprise, or excusable neglect

1

1 "

but rather "other

reasons justifying relief from the operation of a Judgment"
involving attorney misconduct and impropriety

1

which grounds

will sustain a motion even after the Rule's three-month deadline

1

so long as it is brought within a "reasonable" time

period.

The Lower Court'·s failure to grant Swapp's Motion

constitutes an abuse.of discretion remediable on appeal.
For these reasons, the.

Sup~eme

Court of Utah should reverse

the Order of the Third Judicial District Court, and grant
the setting aside of the Default, declare void the Default
Judgment, and further void any post-judgment proc-edings
predicated thereon.

See generally Jenkins v. Arnold,573 P.2d

1013 (Kan. 1978).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED December

3
,
------

1981.

JACK1'1AN & ASSOCIATES

th 800 East, Suite 300
Orem
T 84057 225-1632
Attorneys for Crossclaimant-Appellant
Reid Swapp a/k/a Reid Swapp
Construction Company
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I hereby certify a true & correct copy of the foregoin
was mailed to:
PATRICIA M. LEITH
JOHN A. SNOW
Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys for ·crossclaimant-Respondent
Tanglewood SLC Associates
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
by depositing the same in the U.S. Main, postage prepaid, this

s3

day
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